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PAN-SLAVISM AND CZECHOSLOVAK POLICY DURING WORLD WAR II

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The Czechs and Slovaks, in their culture, civilization, and way of life, have relatively little in common with their Slavic kinsmen to the east. Early in their history these two peoples became Westernized, and their entire social and political thinking developed within the intellectual framework of Western Europe. In the Middle Ages the Czechs took a prominent part in the great movement which the British historian Arnold Toynbee describes as the revolution of the West.[1] The Bohemian Reformation, in its revolt against the absolutism of medieval Church and State and in its insistence on freedom of conscience and equality of men, became a forerunner of the English and American revolutions, and it thus contributed to the Western heritage.[2]

The Europeanization of the region known today as Czechoslovakia was, however, not a peaceful process. More often than not, it involved a desperate struggle, especially against the Germanic tribes whose advance to the east posed a serious threat to the Central European Slavs. Toward the end of the eighteenth century, indeed, it appeared as if the Czechs would inevitably follow the fate of the Slavic tribes along the Elbe which succumbed to Germanization. František Palacký, the Czech historian and national leader, characterized the meaning of his nation's history as follows: "Czech history is the ground on which from time immemorial the antagonisms of Germanism and Slavism have broken out in their sharpest form and have come to their clearest focus. The essential content of Czech history is a perpetual struggle between the German and Slav elements."[3]

The Czech national revival, at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, coincided with German political revival and efforts toward unification; it made this problem particularly acute. The Slovaks were similarly exposed to the denationalization policies of the government in Hungary. Realizing the precariousness of their national existence, the Czechs and Slovaks sought outside help in their endeavors toward cultural, and later political, emancipation. They found assistance not only

in the spiritual movements of European liberalism but also in the consciousness of kinship of blood and language to the other Slavic peoples—in particular, to the Russians. This sentiment, which the Czechs and Slovaks shared especially with the southern Slavs, found its expression in a movement which has been given the name of Pan-Slavism. As understood in Bohemia and Slovakia, Pan-Slavism, or Slavism, as it was known there,[4] had as its main aim close co-operation, especially cultural co-operation, among all Slavic peoples; in the realm of politics, it demanded the co-ordination of Slavic efforts toward political liberty and national independence, under the guidance and protection, and if necessary, with active help, of Russia, the most powerful representative of Slavdom.

Pan-Slavism provided the Czechs and Slovaks with a psychological prop. It gave them a feeling that in their struggle against the Germans and Magyars they were fighting, not with their backs against a wall, but rather as a vanguard of a great and invincible power. The motives of the Pan-Slav movement were derived, in the last analysis, from the instinct of self-preservation—the ultima ratio of the policies of every nation and state.

This was the main reason that Pan-Slavism and its main component, Russophilism, have played such an important role in the modern political life of the Czechs and Slovaks. Its influence on their political thinking and the policies of their government during the Second World War can be understood only within the context of modern Czech and Slovak history.

I. A Century of Pan-Slavism

The tradition of Slavic national consciousness is not a product of the nineteenth century; among the Czechs and Slovaks it dates back to the period of Greater Moravia, at the end of the ninth century.[5] Yet it was only the development of European nationalism, brought about by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, that gave rise to a conscious movement toward Slav co-operation.

The modern development of Czechoslovak Pan-Slavism, as Thomas Masaryk pointed out,[6] was largely influenced by German science and philosophy. However paradoxical this may appear, it was the Germans who helped to promote a movement which, from its very beginning, was directed against them. The works of Schlötzer,[7] the first to call attention to the tremendous strength of the Slavs, fired the imagination and increased the self-confidence of the Czechs and Slovaks. Josef Dobrovský, the pioneer of Slavic philology, was inspired by the philosophy of the German enlightenment. It was, however, the humanitarian philosophy of Herder, the

visionary prophet of a glorious future for all Slavs,[8] which called forth a true revolution in the Slavic world, especially in Bohemia.

Herder's teaching was eagerly adopted by the second generation of Czechoslovak revivalists, led by Kollár, Šafařík, and Palacký. His idealized and romantic concept of the Slavs, whom he identified with peace, humanitarianism, and democracy, was accepted as gospel, and it became a powerful instrument of the growing national consciousness of the Czechs and Slovaks. Herder imparted to Czechoslovak Pan-Slavism a universalist, liberal, and Western democratic tendency which regarded the co-operation of Slavs as a stepping stone toward the achievement of world peace and brotherhood. Jan Kollár, the author of The Daughter of Sláva,[9] elaborated the first theory of all-Slav co-operation, the theory of Slavic reciprocity.[10]

It must be admitted that Kollár's Slavism was still very subdued and passive, in that it was limited to cultural and literary reciprocity and intentionally avoided all political issues. Nevertheless, it is impossible to deny his profound political significance. His Daughter of Sláva was by no means a mere expression of literary enthusiasm; it was a political prophecy and a definite program of action. In it all the problems of modern Slavdom were dealt with, beginning with the question of defense against the Germans and ending with the issue of Slavic unity under the leadership of Russia. Referring to the predicament of the Slovaks, Kollár, in the prelude to The Daughter of Sláva, offers them as a possible course in their struggle for preservation, close association with Russia:

> To the heavens raise your eyes, Tatra's bewildered son;
> Or better, cling with all might to yonder aged oak
> That weathered the ravage of time unto this very day.[11]

The idea of Slavic reciprocity, in spite of its immense popularity, had no solid foundation of concrete knowledge of the Slavic world. The romantic lovers of Slavdom knew practically nothing about the actual political, cultural, and economic conditions prevailing among the Slavic peoples, particularly the Russians.[12] They were fascinated by the immense power and what they considered the world mission of the Russian nation.

The first shock of reality came during the Polish uprising of 1831, when many Czech youths sided with the Poles.[13] Equally significant in countering the romantic dreams of Slavism with real knowledge of Russia were the writings of Karel Havlíček, who next to Palacký was the most important Czech political personality of the mid-century; he was one of the few Czechs of the

time to acquire a first-hand knowledge of Russia.[14] He returned from Moscow with no illusions about Russian society or reciprocity among the Slavs.[15]

In this atmosphere, there was little chance for Kollár's idea of Slavic reciprocity to be translated into a political program when, in 1848, the Czechs and Slovaks entered the Austrian political arena. At the First Slav Congress in Prague,[16] Austro-Slavism, the political co-operation of the Slavs within the Habsburg Empire, prevailed over the rather misty and unrealistic concepts of Pan-Slavism.[17] It urged the necessity of transforming Austria into a democratic federation in which the Slavs would form a majority.[18] Austro-Slavism did not, however, imply that the Slavs should turn their backs on Russia: Palacký maintained that federalization could be successful only if accompanied by an understanding between Austria and Russia.[19]

But the hopes for a regeneration of Austria failed. The Czechs and Slovaks almost instinctively began to return to the idea of Slavic co-operation on a broader basis. Even Havlíček, cautioning that "those who reject small Pan-Slavism (Austro-Slavism) should be careful not to bring about the 'big Pan-Slavism' "[20] clearly indicated that, should there be a choice between Austrian and Russian despotism, the Czechs would prefer the Russian brand.[21] Not even the second Polish uprising, that of 1863, which temporarily split Czech public opinion, could reverse the trend toward Russophilism.

The Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich of 1867, which divided the Empire between the Germans and the Magyars, dealt a mortal blow to the political aspirations of the Czechs and Slovaks. The Czechs, frustrated in the West, now turned their eyes to the East. The political defeat in Vienna was followed immediately by the famous Czechoslovak "pilgrimage" to Moscow, led by František Palacký, to attend the Second Slav Congress.[22] The pilgrimage was meant to be a demonstration against Vienna, but politically it yielded very meager results. It very clearly proved the lack of official Russian interest in the Western Slavs, and the divergence of views between the Westernized Czechs and Slovaks and the Russian Slavophils. The Czechs and Slovaks remained politically isolated in Austria;[23] however, in this isolation they failed to draw the logical consequences from their experience in Moscow.

The following period was characterized by uncritical Russophilism, which permeated the whole of Czech public life. Perhaps most characteristic was Palacký's change of mind.[24] For many

years, the Czechs refused to participate in the Vienna Reichsrat, and thereby they created an atmosphere which was very favorable to the unrealistic and nebulous concepts of Pan-Slavism and especially to Russian-Czech co-operation. Their actual knowledge of Russia and its internal conditions had increased very little, and, in particular, the nation at large had a very unrealistic idea of the character and policies of their eastern "brother." The return to active participation in Austrian politics in 1879, ostensibly on a platform of Austro-Slavism, in no way lessened Czech enthusiasm for Russia, which was generally regarded as the main counterforce to Pan-Germanism.

It was not surprising that in this setting Thomas Masaryk's realistic approach to Slavdom and Russia was understood by only a minority of his compatriots. His criticism of shallow Pan-Slavism and empty pro-Russianism went unheeded by the majority of the nation.[25] This critical stand prevented Masaryk from taking a more positive attitude toward the Neoslavism of Karel Kramář, which aimed at close co-operation among the Slavs and a rapprochement between Austria and Russia.[26]

The main test of Czechoslovak Slavism came during the First World War. The Czechs and Slovaks were appalled by the prospect of having to fight against the Russians and the Serbs, whom they had been taught to consider as their Slavic brothers. Tens of thousands of soldiers deserted to the Russian "enemy." A large part of the Czech leadership thought of the war as an opportunity to realize full national independence and dreamed—in keeping with their Pan-Slav traditions—of a Czechoslovak state to be created in close community with Russia.[27]

It was mainly due to Thomas Masaryk that the center of the Czechoslovak liberation movement was established in the West. Masaryk distrusted the Tsarist regime and had little faith in the internal strength of Russia. Moreover, he regarded the war as a conflict between autocracy and democracy and urged his nation to combine its strength with that of the latter. Yet during the first three years of the war, the liberation movement relied heavily on Russia;[28] it was there that the first Czechoslovak Army was constituted in 1915. Only after the outbreak of the March Russian revolution did the political emphasis begin to shift to the West. Masaryk welcomed the March revolution and personally established friendly relations with its leaders. Later, when the Bolsheviks took over, Czechoslovak sympathies cooled off, in particular after the conflict between the Bolsheviks and the Czechoslovak Legion. Although Masaryk very strongly rejected Bolshevism,[29]

he insisted, at the same time, on a policy of strict neutrality and non-interference in Russian affairs.[30]

The creation of independent Czechoslovakia was essentially due to the victory of the Western democracies. After World War I, Czechoslovakia found its place within the Western political system, which, on the European continent, was based on the predominance of France and the League of Nations' concept of collective security. The temporary disappearance of the German menace, as well as the emergence in Russia of Communism, which was opposed by the majority of the Czechs and Slovaks, tended to obliterate, or at least to blunt, the idea of Slavic brotherhood and traditional Czechoslovak Russophilism. Nevertheless, interest in Russia and the Russian people remained. It found its expression not only in the generous support given to Russian exiles[31] but also in a realistic approach to the Soviet Union itself. Although Czechoslovakia was one of the last states to recognize the Soviet Union de jure, its official representatives, Thomas Masaryk and Eduard Beneš, rejected military intervention[32] and maintained that without Russia, European peace could not be permanently secured.[33]

The triumph of Hitler in Germany and the emergence of the Nazi military menace completely changed the European political scene, upsetting entirely the post-1918 balance of power. Because of its geographical position, Czechoslovakia realized perhaps earlier than any other European power the far-reaching consequences of this change. Its policy of rapprochement with the Soviet Union, which was ultimately expressed in the treaty of May 1935, was determined by an endeavor to re-establish European equilibrium by means of an alliance between the East and the West. The dependence of the operation of this treaty on the French-Soviet agreement of the same year proved clearly that the new policy had little in common with traditional Pan-Slavism. Nor could it be described as an attempt at a new aggressive Pan-Slavism with a Communist content.[34]

In 1938 the collapse of the system of collective security and the indications of a policy of appeasement in the West exposed the weakness of Czechoslovakia's international position between Germany and Russia. By September 1938 it appeared that the attempts of twenty years to overcome this geographical disadvantage by a close association with Western democracies had failed. Recalling Palacký's interpretation of Czech history, the Czechoslovaks regarded their conflict with Nazi Germany as a continuation of the age-old struggle between the Slav and the Teuton. It was only

natural that they began to look to Russia for support. Hitler's scorn and hatred of the Slavs called forth, especially in the broad masses of the people, the old sentiment of Slavic solidarity and Russophilism.[35]

II. The Soviet Union and Munich

The complete diplomatic history of the period of Munich is still to be written. Much is still not known of the attitudes held by the individual governments at this time, so momentous for European, and, indeed, world history. The Communist coup d'état in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 prevented the complete publication of Eduard Beneš's memoirs, which would have been undoubtedly the most significant contribution to our knowledge of the Munich crisis.[36] All the crucial facts are, nevertheless, sufficiently well known, and any additional information could hardly efface, or even diminish, the significance and effects of the Munich decision, which has been described by Sir Winston Churchill as "an awful milestone in our history."[37]

The destruction of the democratic Republic had both political and psychological effects on the people of Czechoslovakia. Perhaps more important than the abandonment by France and the collapse of collective security was the fact that the West, taken as a whole, turned its back on Czechoslovakia and helped to deliver it into the hands of its enemies.

Bitterly disappointed and fearing for their continued national existence, the Czechs and Slovaks had no other choice but to look to Soviet Russia, whose attitude was then much more favorable than that of the West. During the period leading up to the Munich crisis, the Moscow government several times affirmed its determination to stand by its ally and to fulfill its obligations under the 1935 treaty. As late as September 23, 1938 (i.e., after the Anglo-French ultimatum of September 21), Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet Foreign Commissar, declared that the USSR was prepared, in accordance with the Soviet-Czechoslovak pact, to render to Czechoslovakia immediate and effective help if France would remain loyal to her ally and give similar aid, or if the League of Nations would recommend it in keeping with Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant.[38]

There appears to be no question of the apparent willingness of the Soviet Union to fulfill the treaty obligations, but all available evidence seems to indicate that Russia was not prepared—as it is claimed by many subsequent political writers—to render to Czechoslovakia full military help, regardless of the attitude of

the French. This conclusion can be reached—apart from unequivocal official declarations of the Soviet government—from a number of statements made by the Czechoslovak President himself. Defending his decision to yield to the Munich verdict, Beneš admitted in Considerations on Slavdom that during the crisis he had considered and rejected an "isolated war" between Czechoslovakia with the help of the Soviet Union on one side and Nazi Germany, on the other.[39] His belief in the automatic help of the Soviet Union was by no means absolute; his uncertainty is shown in the following statement: "To embark on such an isolated war on one front, and to force or induce, in keeping with the treaty of 1935, the Soviet Union to take part in it. . . to me appeared to be suicidal. . . ."[40] Neither was Beneš certain of the nature and extent of possible Soviet assistance. He only "had no doubts that, in some form or another, the Soviet Union would come to our aid."[41] During the war years in London, he privately[42] expressed the conviction that the behavior of the Soviet government was dictated solely by its immediate interests; had Czechoslovakia gone to war, it could have counted, at the most, on aid similar to that given by Moscow to the Spanish government. Beneš's Memoirs, which display exceptional frankness in many respects, leave little doubt as to his opinion that in the Munich crisis Moscow made full military help dependent on French action.[43]

The friendship of the Soviet Union, allegedly going far beyond its treaty obligations, was not, however, put to the test. The Czechoslovak government capitulated. All available evidence seems to indicate that the Moscow government accepted the Czechoslovak decision, which saved it from considerable embarrassment, with the feeling of relife.[44] This is fully confirmed by the behavior of the Czechoslovak communists in the period following Munich. While condemning the capitulation as a "conspiracy against the people, state, and democracy," they carefully avoided even the slightest hint that the Soviet Union might have been willing to support Czechoslovakia at any cost.[45] Only in 1949, after the communist seizure of power, did Klement Gottwald, the leader of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, make the surprising assertion that in September 1938, Stalin offered direct military help to Czechoslovakia on condition that it fight and ask the USSR for help. The offer, which Stalin was supposed to have made to Gottwald personally, was allegedly communicated to President Beneš, who is said, however, to have taken no action.[46] That the disclosure, which could have been made any time after Munich, came only after the 1948 coup d'état, raises serious doubts as to its authenticity.

It is hardly believable that the Czechoslovak communists would not have made use of it in the period of German-Soviet understanding, as an argument against the liberation movement, which they opposed. Gottwald's story seems rather to be one of the many propaganda fabrications by which the present communist government endeavors to increase the prestige of the Soviet Union and to discredit the representatives of democratic Czechoslovakia in the eyes of the Czech and Slovak people.

Yet in the tragic days of Munich, the Soviet record appeared to be unblemished. Russia in no way participated in the Munich verdict, it publicly declared its willingness to fulfill its treaty obligations, and, after the capitulation of Czechoslovakia, it energetically condemned the action committed against its ally. These mere facts were regarded as sufficient evidence of its faithfulness to its treaty obligations. The awareness that the Munich decision was also directed against the Soviet Union gave rise to a consciousness of community of fate between the two peoples.

The crash of a whole world of ideals and beliefs, combined as it was with a deadly menace to the very existence of the nation, forced the Czechs and Slovaks to revise their relationship to the outside world. In the hour of their utmost trial, friendship and alliance with the Western democracies were of no avail. France and England not only abandoned their Central European sister, the only democratic state east of the Rhine, but also took part in her humiliation.

Although much more disastrous and tragic than the political defeat at the time of the Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich of 1867 (which took place in the relatively liberal atmosphere of Austria), Munich called forth a similar political and psychological reaction. The Czechs and Slovaks, filled with resentment against the West, turned their eyes to the East—to those who had been traditionally regarded as protectors of small Slavic nations. And, indeed, in 1938 there was much in the international diplomatic record of the Soviet Union which would seem to justify the faith and hopes of the Czechoslovak people: the Soviet government had condemned Japanese aggression in China, had spoken against Italian aggression in Ethiopia, and was favoring of strengthening the League of Nations. Faced with the prospect of losing their independence and freedom, the people seemed to forget, or simply disregard, the basic ideological differences between their democratic state and the Soviet Union. Even with many of those who, in the past, stood resolutely against any association with the Soviet Union, fear of imminent national destruction proved to be stronger than their horror of communism.

Such were the circumstances under which a new rebirth of Russophilism—definitely much stronger than at any time before —took place. It was based on a feeling of hopeless isolation and immediate danger rather than on any definite concept of future Soviet-Czechoslovak relations. In 1938 and after, as in the past, the Czechoslovak attitude toward Russia was determined by the menacing shadow of Pan-Germanism, which aimed at the enslavement and annihilation of the Central European Slavs. Almost automatically, faith in the Russian people revived latent feelings of Slavic solidarity. The nation returned to the nineteenth century ideals of Jan Kollár and of all those who sought the salvation of their nation in Russian strength.

III. The Rebirth of Pan Slavism

This faith in Russia, strengthened by the energetic Soviet protest against the occupation of the rest of Czechoslovakia, [47] was given a serious setback by the German-Soviet treaty of August 1939 and subsequent Soviet neutrality in the early years of the Second World War. Even more depressing were the further acts of the Moscow government—the attack upon Poland, the occupation of the Baltic states, and, in particular, the war of aggression against Finland. The Czechoslovak public at home and the leaders in exile abroad well realized that all these actions were in direct conflict with the policies and principles which the Soviet government had defended at the time of Munich and, earlier, in the League of Nations.

Opinions were not lacking which, in keeping with the stand taken by the majority of the West European public, severly condemned the new Soviet foreign policy, especially the unprovoked attack upon Finland. The Czechs and Slovaks, with bitterness and sorrow, criticized the Soviet Union for starting a war, the justice of which the Czechoslovaks, despite their pro-Russianism, could not recognize. To recognize the Russian aggression as just, it was held, "would be contrary not only to the principles of humanity and the freedom of a small nation, but it also would be tantamount to condoning the Nazi attack against Czechoslovakia itself." [48]

The official leadership of the Czechoslovak liberation movement abroad nevertheless maintained a position of strict neutrality and reserve, carefully avoiding active propaganda against the Soviet Union. In his Memoirs, Eduard Beneš describes his policy as follows:

> As is obvious, I did not allow myself to be deceived by the apparent rapprochement between Germany and

> the Soviet Union . . . . From the very beginning, I excluded the possibility that any such agreement could be genuine and in any manner permanent. It could be only a measure of a transitory period and need, dictated by the opportunistic and tactical considerations of both partners.[49]

Beneš further observes:

> During this whole dramatical phase of the Soviet policy, I remained, on the whole, in a state of calm, albeit tense, expectancy, and in spite of the violent and permanent polemics in the public as to its essence and significance, I did not consider myself impelled to change my general line at all.[50]

The motives behind this Czechoslovak policy, as viewed by Beneš, must be sought, in the first place, in the recent experience of Munich. The prestige which the Soviet Union had then acquired among practically all Czechs and Slovaks was so great that the majority of Czechoslovak political leaders were reluctant to prejudice Czechoslovakia's relationship with the country which appeared to be its only friend. There is also no doubt that the traditional inclination toward Russia played a considerable role in the formulation of this Czechoslovak policy. As at many times in the past, these feelings precluded the adoption of an anti-Russian attitude.

There was a firm conviction that sooner or later the Soviet Union would be pulled into the war, and not on the side of Germany. In a report addressed to the leaders of the Czechoslovak underground movement and despatched before the conclusion of the Russo-German pact, Eduard Beneš not only predicted the imminent outbreak of war but also expressed the opinion that the Soviet Union "in the end will go against Germany, and that, in any case, it will support us politically."[51] In a broadcast from London, immediately after the collapse of France, he reaffirmed unequivocally his expectation of conflict between Russia and Germany.[52]

This conviction, perhaps more than anything else, made it possible for the liberation movement to pass in silence over Soviet actions directed against important Czechoslovak interests. In September 1939 Moscow recognized the independent state of Slovakia, created under the protection of Nazi Germany. In December of the same year, the Czechoslovak mission in Moscow was asked to discontinue its activities, and the Czechoslovak Minister was requested to leave the Soviet Union.

Despite numerous declarations by the Czechoslovak communists, endeavoring to prove ex post facto a favorable attitude of

the Kremlin toward the liberation movement,[53] the Soviets had little understanding of the cause of Czechoslovak freedom. Perhaps the only example of their good will which is worth mentioning was the attitude toward a military refugee group which, after the occupation of western Poland by the Germans, found refuge on Russian soil. The unit was interned in the Ukraine, in Kamenets-Podolsk, and was granted a status similar in many respects to that of units of the Red Army. Two contingents from this group were even allowed, before the German attack against Russia, to leave for the West in order to join the Czechoslovak Army in France.[54]

Soviet behavior caused great embarrassment and led to considerable confusion among Czechoslovak communists. Many of them could not understand why the struggle for Czechoslovak freedom, which had hitherto been supported both by their party and the Soviet government, should, after August 1939 become, in the eyes of the Soviets, despicable "service to British imperialism." Some communists, including Vlado Clementis, refused to follow this line. Disregarding the most severe sanctions which were applied against them by the party, they joined the Czechoslovak Army in France.[55]

The attack of Nazi Germany against Russia, which seemed to confirm Beneš's policy, had a tremendous influence on the Czechoslovak public at home and the government in exile in London. All the disappointment and bitterness of recent months were forgotten, and the 1938 relationship between the Czechoslovak government and the Soviet Union was fully restored.[56]

The Czechoslovaks, as members of the anti-Axis coalition, were greatly impressed by the Soviet heroic defense against the Nazi invaders; their reaction was further determined by their traditional sympathies to Russia as a great Slavic power. The sentiments which were called forth by Munich and temporarily dampened by Soviet neutrality in the early years of the struggle revived with new vigor. The Nazi aggression against the Russian people was interpreted in the light of the Czech thesis of the age-old conflict between the Slavs and the Teutons.

But it was the Soviet Union itself which, in its endeavor to revive Russia's past, started a new movement of all-Slav co-operation. On the twenty-fourth anniversary of the October Revolution, Stalin, speaking of the "great patriotic war," declared that Adolf Hitler was out to "exterminate the Slav peoples."[57] Promising aid to them, Stalin added, "We have not and cannot have such war aims as imposing our will and our regime on the Slavs

and other enslaved peoples of Europe who are awaiting our aid."[58] The speech was a signal for the launching of a new Pan-Slavism. As early as August 1941 the first Slav Congress met in Moscow to formulate the program and the practical policies of the movement. Declaring the principle of unity in the struggle against Hitlerite Germany, the Congress accepted a policy of future peaceful co-operation of all Slavic States which was to assure to them an honorable place among other nations. It solemnly rejected the former Russian ideas of Pan-Slavism and Pan-Russianism based on Russian supremacy, and gave assurance that the new movement would be based entirely on reciprocity and equality. This co-operation was, however, not to be exclusive; it was not to preclude friendly relations with other nations.[59] There followed further congresses, manifestoes, and other activities.[60] The Moscow endeavor quickly spread to all parts of the free world where people of Slavic origin resided, in particular to England and the United States.

The Czechoslovaks became the most ardent supporters of the new movement. They saw in it a continuation and perhaps a realization of the ideals and visions by which they had lived for almost a century. It appeared that the new Slavic solidarity which was to arise out of the Second World War would be based on the idealistic conceptions of Jan Kollár. The words of Alexey Tolstoy referring to "the role of the Slav peoples in the formation of European humanism"[61] seemed to confirm their hopes.

The official policy of the Czechoslovak government in London embraced the program of Slavic solidarity and recognized its political relevance. In particular, it presented a strong argument against the pro-Nazi government of Slovakia, which took part in the war on the side of the Axis. Slavic co-operation was emphasized in the public utterances of the representatives of the liberation movement, in the Czechoslovak press in exile, and it became an integral part of post-war planning. In London a Czechoslovak Slavic Committee was started which organized meetings and published pamphlets on different problems of Slavic solidarity.[62]

The ideology of new Pan-Slavism and its apparently wholehearted acceptance by the Soviet Union seemed to vindicate the foreign policies of the government in exile. The program to create a barrier of Slavic states against German imperialism was regarded as a guarantee of future Czechoslovak security. Through its content and traditions, this new Slavism had little in common with Bolshevik doctrine and past policies; it represented perhaps the most radical deviation from the rigid ideology

of Marxism-Leninism. It offered to the non-communist majority of the Czechoslovak people an acceptable platform for the future close relations of Czechoslovakia with the Soviet Union. The fact that the Soviet government took the initiative in launching the new policy was interpreted as meaning that it was searching for a new, non-revolutionary, more orthodox, approach to its foreign relations. The principle of equality and reciprocity, solemnly declared, removed the objections which in the past had prevented an agreement between the Czechoslovak and Russian protagonists of Slavic solidarity.

Also, the new Slavic policy seemed to permit Czechoslovakia to continue its relationship with Poland without violating the spirit of the Soviet-Czechoslovak alliance. In spite of little enthusiasm on the part of the Soviet government, Czechoslovakia signed in the beginning of 1942 an agreement with the Polish government in London on the future Polish-Czechoslovak Confederation.[63]

Czechoslovak enthusiasm for the idea of Slavic co-operation, as one of the corner stones of the Russian-Czechoslovak relationship, reached its apex on the occasion of President Beneš's visit to Moscow and the conclusion of the Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance, and Post-War Co-operation of December 1943. It was regarded not only as an important link in the future post-war security system, comparable to the 1942 British-Soviet treaty, but also as a definite understanding between two Slavic states. In the opinion of Beneš, the treaty was "a very concrete and meaningful expression of Slavic policy."[64] And indeed the problem of future co-operation of Slavic states ranked high both on the official and unofficial agenda during his visit. In fact, Beneš's first encounter with a high Soviet official, Alexander Korneychuk, the Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, who was sent to meet him at an R.A.F. base in Iraq, was largely devoted to the discussion of the "future Slavic policy of the Soviet Union."[65] Later, during the official negotiations, Molotov and Stalin himself frequently took up the same subject.[66] Also the reaction of those whom the Czechoslovak President met on less official occasions — during visits to factories, cultural institutions, and casual conversations — seemed to indicate the genuine sentiments of Slavic solidarity among the Russian people. In his Memoirs, Beneš summed up his impressions as follows: "Everything was directed toward the conduct of war, the front, post-war co-operation, and, as far as we were concerned, to our mutual co-operation and the future Slavic community."[67]

It is obvious that Eduard Beneš regarded the new Russian Pan-Slavism as a definite policy of the Soviet government. He looked upon it with particular satisfaction, because the underlying principles of new Slavism—equality and reciprocity—augured well for the future of the Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty, which he had just concluded. They served him as a further guarantee that the Kremlin would abide by its treaty obligation not to interfere with Czechoslovak internal affairs.[68]

The complete success of his negotiations, as well as the cordial atmosphere in which they were conducted, confirmed Beneš's belief in the strength and genuine character of the bonds of Slav brotherhood uniting the Russian nation with the Czechs and Slovaks. Before leaving Moscow, he expressed his feelings in a highly optimistic broadcast to Czechoslovakia in which he said:

> You, my dear Czechoslovak compatriots, must conceive of my present visits in the spirit of our whole national history of the last centuries; it is an expression of what our great national revivalists saw in the Russian nation, of the esteem in which it was held by Dobrovský, Kollár, Palacký, Šafařík and Hurban Vajanský, and which was manifested by the travels to Russia of our great democrat Havlíček, our Palacký and Rieger . . . .
>
> My present trip to Moscow—similarly as my visit in 1935—is not a momentary gesture of war-time policy which will be abandoned in the course of further developments; for me this visit is only a self-evident consequence, a logical conclusion, and an evolutionary termination of a policy of a century.[69]

Beneš consciously linked the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty with the new Slavic policy, regarding it as the beginning of a "new important political phase and possibly as a model for all Slavs."

His optimism was confirmed by the attitude of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, whose leaders he met during his Moscow visit. The President was greatly impressed by their ardent support of the idea of Slavic solidarity, which was even more enthusiastic than that of non-communist Czechs and Slovaks. The Czech and Slovak communists' enthusiastic acceptance of the new concept of international relations within the Slavic world—so different from their former dogmatic approach—was perhaps more surprising than their sudden patriotism and loyalty to Beneš's government in London. Casting away their rigid ideology and scorn for the "bourgeois" interpretation of history, the communist leaders began to speak with great reverence of the old Slavic traditions of the Czechs and Slovaks. Nejedlý, the Czechoslovak member of the Moscow All-Slav Committee, declared that "the Slavic idea,

which at the time of Kollár was a noble effort toward rapprochement and brotherly love among the Slav nations, today represents a real strength which will play an important role in post-war Europe."[70]

The Pan-Slav fervor of the Czechoslovak communists reached its zenith in the speech delivered by the communist leader Klement Gottwald after the conclusion of the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty. Calling the Czechs and Slovaks the outpost of Slavdom, he paraphrased the famous verses of Jan Kollár: "The dreams of the noblest thinkers of our nations have been fulfilled: our Slavic linden has found a powerful support in the mighty Russian Slavic oak."[71]

IV. Beneš's Concept of a New Slavic Policy

Eduard Beneš, like Thomas Masaryk, was a Westerner in his intellectual and general cultural background. The Republic which he helped to create rested on the Western ideology of democracy, and in its early years looked to the West for guidance and support.

Yet the main characteristic of Beneš's foreign policy was not its Western orientation but its endeavor to blend Czechoslovak national interests with the high moral purpose of the new enlightened concept of international co-operation.[72] Beneš's policy was neither Western nor Eastern, but a European and world policy, as he declared in 1942: "Our foreign policy—corresponding to two unvarying and invariable pillars of our national existence, i.e., our geographical position in Europe between the East and the West and our ten centuries of national tradition—has not been and will not be either Western only or Eastern only, but European, internationally synthetic."[73]

To the achievement of this policy Eduard Beneš devoted all his energies. He worked consistently for the strengthening of collective security and for the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe which, he held, was unobtainable without the return of Russia into the European order.

It is questionable whether the collapse of collective security and the disaster of Munich, which lay so heavily on his mind, impelled Beneš to change the basic premises of his foreign policy. The destruction of Czechoslovakia strengthened his belief in the inability of the West to give to his country sufficient protection against the dangers of Pan-Germanism. He came to the conclusion that Czechoslovak national interest required close co-operation and alliance with the Soviet Union.[74] This, however, was not to imply that Czechoslovakia should abandon another, equally important axiom of its foreign policy, namely its European and internationally

sympathetic character. The new Soviet-Czechoslovak alliance was to operate within the framework of a general understanding between the East and the West, of which understanding Beneš was an ardent champion.[75]

These basic premises of Beneš's foreign policy also provide a key to the understanding of his approach to the future role of the revived Pan-Slav movement. Although his realistic mind was unmoved by the sentimental appeal of Slav brotherhood, Beneš recognized the importance of the new policy from the point of view of the Czechoslovak relationship both to the Soviet Union and Germany.

This was perhaps the reason that in the autumn of 1944 he published The Considerations on Slavdom, a book entirely devoted to the discussion of the problem of Slav co-operation. His 1943 optimism had by then largely disappeared. Russian Pan-Slavism in no way helped to heal the split between the Soviet government and the governments of Poland and Yugoslavia. Czechoslovakia's relationship with Moscow also ran into unexpected difficulties. Nevertheless, Beneš still believed in the possibility of future co-operation which he thought would play an important role in post-war Central and Eastern Europe. Rather than attempting to work out the ideology of new Slavism, Beneš in his book turned his attention to the conditions of future collaboration.

Like his predecessors, he sought the foundation of future co-operation in the ethnic, linguistic, and, to a certain degree, the cultural community of all Slavic peoples. He warned, however, against an emotional approach. To be successful, this new Slavism must rest on the firm recognition of common interests. Concrete collaboration would have to take place not only in the political, but also in the cultural and economic spheres. But Beneš cautioned the Slav nations not to permit—as had happened in the past—the abuse of cultural understanding for political purposes and its transformation into a movement toward "mystical Slavic unification."[76]

By far the most important part of Considerations of Slavdom is devoted to Beneš's thoughts on the political content of the future partnership of the Slavic states. Rejecting the reactionary spirit of Slavophilism and other Slavic messianisms of the past, Beneš held that new Slavism must be founded on a "politically democratic and popular revolutionary program."[77] To him the problem of every Slav nation was the question of the emancipation of the "man in the street," the worker and the peasant. Should this emancipation take place, Beneš foresaw for the Slavic states a strengthening and consolidation which would provide a solid foundation for their partnership.

Beneš regarded as the main political aim of the new Slavic policy the common defense against the renewal of German imperialism. He warned, however, against regarding the idea of Slavic solidarity "solely from the point of view of the conflict between the Slavs and the Germans."[78] The real mission of the Slavs, he maintained, must not be negative but positive and constructive. He indicated that the best solution of their relationship to the Germans might be found in the new collective security organization to be founded after the war. Yet defense against Germany must be regarded as the key to Beneš's concept of Slavic policy. This follows from his final judgment that, so long as Pan-Germanism has not been made impossible, "all Slavs must have a definite and common defensive policy against Germany."[79]

Finally, the policy of new Slavism, as understood by Beneš, was to secure for all Slav nations and cultures a "new position in Europe and the world."[80] Only through co-operation will they be able to achieve the same moral and political prestige as that enjoyed by the Anglo-Saxons, Germans, and the Latin nations. At the same time, Beneš remained faithful to the Czechoslovak traditional humanitarian and progressive conception of the mission of Slavdom. He expressed it as follows: "To the outside world the new Slavic policy must appear, and in all sincerity must be presented, as a contribution of all Slav nations to the post-war European and world system of collective security. And, in the end, this Slavism again must culminate in the principles of Kollár's humanity."[81] Beneš's universalism is apparent also from his discussion of the form which the new Slav co-operation might assume. He referred to the possibility of a "regional League of Nations,"[82] or even a closer association on a basis similar to the British Commonwealth. But he expressed the opinion that such development should not be artificially hastened, for that might be detrimental to the consolidation of Europe.[83]

Such, then, were the conditions, the fulfillment of which Eduard Beneš regarded as essential for the post-war success of the policy of new Slavism. He frankly admitted the difficulties standing in its way. Apart from the Soviet-Polish conflict—which at that time appeared to be insoluble—Beneš saw the main obstacle in the attitude which the Soviet Union itself might later manifest. For his former optimism was gone, and doubts had begun to enter his mind as to the sincerity of the Soviet Union and the validity of its promises.[84] He no longer felt as he had in 1943; he was no longer certain whether Soviet Pan-Slavism would remain a permanent feature of the

Kremlin policy. There were important factors which, in his opinion, favored the continuation of an affirmative attitude of the Soviet Union toward post-war Slavism: the emotional ties of the majority of the Russian people to the other Slav nations, the continued German menace, and concrete practical interests. Yet Beneš considered it necessary to pose the following question: "Will Russian communism and, under its influence, the Soviet Union, return after the war to pure communist doctrine, so that war-time Slavism will appear to have been nothing but mere tactics?"[85] To this question Beneš did not find a conclusive answer. Although he admitted that Pan-Slavism in the Soviet Union "might become a permanent phenomenon,"[86] he immediately limited his judgment by stipulating the conditions under which such development could take place. First of all, the official policy of the Soviet government would have to convince the smaller Slavic states that Russian Pan-Slavism does not involve any danger to their national independence. Secondly, the Russian Bolshevik Party would have to refrain from monopolizing the idea of Slavic solidarity and transforming it into a leftist messianism, "supported by the communist parties of the smaller Slavic states."[87]

Beneš readily admitted that the Soviet Union, as the largest and most powerful Slav state, should enjoy a special position in the new system of Slavic co-operation. It would be able to contribute more to the common cause and therefore its moral position and its position as regards political power would be automatically stronger. But, in keeping with the democratic conception of new Slavism as a partnership of equals, Russia should not assume the role of protector to the smaller Slavic states. Beneš warned emphatically against any such attempts, predicting that they would ruin the chances of any future genuine understanding and collaboration among the Slavs.

The fears and doubts which at the end of 1944 caused great anxiety to the Czechoslovak President, were fully substantiated by the developments which marked the end of the Second World War in Eastern Europe. Slavic solidarity did not prevent Stalin from taking possession—even before Beneš's return to Czechoslovakia and the complete liberation of the country—of Ruthenia, the eastern-most province of the Republic.[88] Alarming reports began to arrive from the Slavic countries which were occupied by Russians, indicating that the Red Army was acting not like the army of a Slav ally but as an agent of Soviet communism.

Stalin and his associates had, however, no intention of abandoning Pan-Slav propaganda, which was very effective, especially

in Czechoslovakia. Of this President Beneš became painfully aware during his second visit to Moscow, in March 1945. He was on his way home, to the liberated territories of his country, and his stay in the Soviet capital was a critical period for the future of Czechoslovakia. Beneš's reception by the Soviet authorities, unlike that in 1943, was very cool, and the negotiations with the leaders of the Czechoslovak communists on the appointment of a new government were equally depressing, as the communists managed to secure the key positions in the new Cabinet.[89]

Perhaps the only reminder of the former atmosphere of friendship and cordiality was Stalin's reference to the Slavic policy, at the official farewell banquet given in Beneš's honor. Stalin drank a toast to the new Slavism and emphasized the determination of the Soviet government not to interfere with the internal affairs of its Slavic allies. Stalin stated, evidently for the benefit of his Czechoslovak guests: "The Soviet Union wants nothing else than to gain allies who will always be prepared to resist the German danger. The Soviet Union will not interfere with the internal affairs of its allies. I know that even among you there are such who doubt it. Perhaps even you are a little dubious, but I give the assurance that we will never interfere in the internal affairs of our allies. Such is Lenin's Neo-Slavism, which we Bolshevik communists are following. There can be no talk of a hegemony of the Soviet Union."[90]

However gratifying, the speech did not impress Eduard Beneš. For he had no reason to believe that the Soviets would honor their Slavic obligations any more than they had respected their obligations arising out of the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty.[91]

It is outside the scope of this article to deal with the brief history of post-war Pan-Slavism in Czechoslovakia. There were numerous manifestations of Slavic solidarity which, especially immediately after the liberation, attracted considerable public attention. Nevertheless, the spirit of these manifestations was alien not only to Beneš's conception of new Slavism but also to the program of the war-time All-Slav congresses in Moscow. In fact, what Beneš feared and expressed in his Considerations on Slavdom became a reality. The communists, arrogating for themselves positions of leadership, used the issue of Pan-Slavism for the purposes of their own policies. Under the disguise of Pan-Slav slogans, they prepared the ground for the domination of the country by the Soviet Union.[92]

Summary and Conclusions

The influence of the ideology of Pan-Slavism on the Czechoslovak policy during the Second World War cannot be disputed. Of course, the sovietization of Czechoslovakia, which took place in February 1948 (but really started immediately after the 1945 liberation), was caused by reasons beyond the control of the London government and the Czech and Slovak people. But Slavism and sympathy for Russia had an important share in the determination of the policies of the Czechoslovak President and his associates. These ideas and feelings also greatly influenced the thinking of the people in the country under its occupation. In summary, one can trace three main characteristics of Czechoslovak Pan-Slavism during the Second World War.

As in the past, the feeling of Slavic solidarity was based on emotional rather than rational foundations. Russia under the communists was misunderstood, being conceived of in the spirit of the national revivalists and Czech nationalists of the pre-1914 period. It is obvious that the Czechs and Slovaks, whom many political observers expected to "interpret Russia to the Western world,"[93] were ill equipped for this responsible task.

The lack of knowledge of Russia was aggravated by a wrong interpretation of the future development of Soviet Communism—the belief that Russian national traditions and practical considerations would prevail over Bolshevik dogma. It is only fair to say that in this mistake the Czechoslovaks were by no means alone, and that after Teheran and Yalta nothing else was left to them but to hope for the best.

Secondly, the key to the understanding of Czechoslovak Slavism is to be found, in the last analysis, in the relationship of Czechoslovakia to Germany. The fear of German imperialism and the desire to stop once and for all the German Drang nach Osten —which had become a deadly menace after Munich—tended to drive the Czechs and Slovaks into the hands of the Russians. Yet there can be no doubt that a large part of responsibility for this development rested with the West which in 1938 abandoned Czechoslovakia to its fate. Thomas Masaryk's observation in 1916 was again justified: the small Slavic peoples saw a powerful protector in mighty Russia, because they were constantly menaced by the Germans, whereas the western European powers displayed little interest in them.[94] Thus Munich prepared the political and psychological background for the strong revival of Pan-Slavism.

It is obvious that the return of the Russian and Czechoslovak communists to the idea of Pan-Slavism, like the revival of other national traditions, in 1941, was nothing but tactics. Pan-Slavism not only aimed at the mobilization of the Slavs in the struggle against Nazi Germany but also prepared the way for future Russian expansion.

After 1945, the Czechs and Slovaks became, for the first time in history, immediate neighbors of Russia. The spreading of Russian influence into Eastern and Central Europe did not, however, take place in the spirit of the humanitarian and democratic philosophy of Jan Kollár. What Palacký feared in the middle of the last century, the establishing of a universal Russian Empire, had become a reality. Whatever remained of the idea of Slavic solidarity was absorbed by Pan-Russian communist messianism. What happened represents an important milestone in the political thinking of the Czechs and Slovaks. When put to the test, the great dream of Slavic solidarity and brotherhood with the Russian nation proved to be an illusion.

At the end of his life, Palacký, despairing over the possibility of a just Austria and seeking consolation in Russian strength, declared that his greatest mistake had been his "faith in the reason and sense of justice of the German nation."[95] Almost a century later, Eduard Beneš, who wanted to strengthen the position of his nation by co-operation with Russia, came to a similar conclusion: "My greatest mistake," he said in September 1947, "has been my belief in Russia and in the sincerity of Stalin."[96]

Notes

1. "The Revolution We Are Living Through," The New York Times Magazine, July 25, 1954, p. 44.

2. Ibid., p. 7.

3. František Palacký, Die Geschichte des Hussitentums und Professor Constantin Höfler (Prague, 1868), quoted from S. Harrison Thomson, Czechoslovakia in European History (Princeton, 1953), p. 132.

4. In Czech and Slovak studies, the terms slovanství (Slavism), or slovanská otázka (the Slavic question) are generally used to describe the Czechoslovak brand of Pan-Slavism. It must be sharply distinguished from Russian Pan-Slavism (Pan-Russianism), as understood by some of the Slavophils and men like Danilevsky, Leontiev, or Katkov. This Russian Pan-Slavism demanded of all Slav nations that they not only submit to the leadership of Russia, but also renounce their own aspirations to an independent life, that they merge with Russia and the Russian nation and accept

the Orthodox faith. Pan-Russianism was rejected by all Czech and Slovak leaders.

5. A concise survey of the early history of Czech and Slovak Slavism can be found in Roman Jakobson's "Comparative Slavic Studies," in the Review of Politics, January 1954, pp. 67-90.

6. See Thomas Masaryk, Česká otázka (The Czech Question; Prague, 1908), pp. 36, 51.

7. August Ludwig von Schlötzer was Professor of Philosophy and Statistics at the University of Göttingen.

8. Johann Gottfried von Herder, German philosopher and critic. In his Ideen zur Philosophie der Menschheit (Eng. tr., Outline of the Philosophy of Man, 1800; Weimar, 1784-91), he regards the Slavs as bearers of true humanity and human progress.

9. Slávy dcera (The Daughter of Sláva), a poetic cycle of 645 sonnets, expressing the author's sorrow over the destruction of the Elbe Slavs and exhorting all Slavic nations to unite against the Germanic onslaught.

10. Expounded in Über die literarische Wechselseitigkeit zwischen den verschiedenen Stämmen und Mundarten der slawischen Nation (On the Literary Solidarity Between the Various Peoples and Dialects of the Slavic Nation), published in 1837 in German; later published in Czech, Russian, and Serbian.

11. Translated by R. A. Ginsburg, in Jan Kollár, a Poet of Pan-Slavism (Chicago, 1943).

12. See Masaryk, Česká otázka, pp. 56, 71 f.

13. Ibid., p. 48.

14. Havlíček spent almost two years in Moscow as a tutor in the family of Shevyrev, prominent professor of the University of Moscow and prominent Slavophil.

15. See Thomas Masaryk, Karel Havlíček (Prague, 1920), pp. 229 f.; Hermann Münch, Böhmische Tragödie (Hamburg, 1949), p. 141.

16. Convened on June 2, 1848, and attended by 341 delegates, representing mainly the Austrian Slavs. The Whitsunday insurrection of students and workers (the Prague 1848 revolution) brought about a sudden end to the congress, on June 12.

17. See František Roubík, Český rok 1848 (The Year 1848 in Bohemia; Prague, 1948), pp. 194-218; also Münch, pp. 190-196.

18. The idea of Austro-Slavism was perhaps best expressed in the famous reply of František Palacký to the invitation to the Frankfurt German National Assembly (Vorparlament) which insisted on the necessity of Austria and rejected both Pan-Germanism and the idea of a "universal Russian Empire."

19. See Masaryk, Česká otázka, p. 89.

20. Ibid., p. 111.

21. Ibid.

22. The Czech and Slovak delegation was composed of the leaders of the political and scientific life. In addition to Palacký it included the leaders of the Old Czech Party (F. L. Rieger and F. A. Brauner) and of the Young Czech Party (J. Grégr), the painter Quido Manes, the poet K. J. Erben, and others. The Slovaks were represented by the national leaders J. Jesenský, O. Radlinský, and P. Mudroň.

23. In their opposition against the Ausgleich, the Czechs remained isolated. They failed to secure the support of the Poles and even of the Slovenes; see Milan Prelog, Pout Slovanů do Moskvy (The Slav Pilgrimage to Moscow; Prague, 1931), p. 22.

24. Toward the end of his life, Palacký lost faith in the possibility of a "just" Austria and foresaw a struggle between the Slavs and the Germans. His bitterness is expressed in his letter to J. Vaclik, a Czech settled in Petrograd: "The time will soon come when it will be necessary to punish . . . the Teutons for their pride and haughtiness, to teach them civility and justice. . . . This is the historical mission of Slavdom in general, and of Russia, in particular . . . ." The Archives of the Bohemian Museum, quoted from J. Slavik, "František Palacký a Rusko," in Zahraniční Politika (Foreign Policy), 1926, pp. 585-590.

25. Speaking of the uncritical Russophilism at the beginning of the First World War, Masaryk said: "My critical attitude toward Russia was obviously justified and correct, but now it was too late to criticize Russia publicly and to put our Russophilism into proper perspective. Also, the people, in the war-time excitement, would hardly understand my criticism. I was misunderstood by many already before the war"; Thomas Masaryk, Světová revoluce (Eng. tr., The Making of the State, 1927; Prague, 1925), pp. 28-29.

26. Neoslavism was based on the idea of freedom and equality of the Slav nations. Its impetus came from the 1905 Russian revolution, and the movement culminated in the Prague Slav Congress in 1908.

27. See Thomas Masaryk, Světová revoluce, p. 25.

28. Until the time of the Russian revolutions, the Czechoslovak revolutionary publications abroad, such as the Československá samostatnost (published in Switzerland) and La nation tchèque (published by E. Denis in Paris), emphasized the importance of Russia for the liberation movement.

29. Thomas Masaryk, Světová revoluce, pp. 209 f.

30. Ibid., pp. 222 f.; Masaryk distinguished between intervention in the internal affairs of the Bolshevik government, which he rejected as contrary to international law, and a war against Bolshevik Russia. As far as the latter possibility was concerned, he

stated expressly: "I have considered war against the Bolsheviks and Russia; I would have joined, with our military corps, an army which would have been strong enough to fight the Bolsheviks and the Germans and to defend democracy against Bolshevism. There was only one chance for such a war—the mobilization of the Japanese. To take this step not only America but also Paris and London were unwilling." Ibid., pp. 226-227.

31. See The Czechoslovak Help to the Russian and Ukraine Emigration (government publication), Prague, 1924.

32. See Masaryk's report for President Wilson of April, 1918, Světová revoluce, pp. 239 f.; also Eduard Beneš, Světová válka a naše revoluce (Eng. tr., My War Memoirs, 1928; 2nd ed., Prague, 1935), pp. 178 f.

33. See Eduard Beneš, Five Years of Czechoslovak Foreign Policy (Prague, 1924), p. 22.

34. The Soviet-German treaty of 1926 gave to the Soviet-German co-operation a much broader basis in many respects than the 1935 Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty.

35. See Petr Zenkl, "Jak to dělali" (How It Happened), Svornost (Czech daily), January 13, 1952, p. 1.

36. Eduard Beneš published only one volume of the Paměti (Memoirs) in 1947. The two volumes dealing with the period of Munich were then ready for publication; after Benes's death, however, they fell into the hands of the communist government.

37. Sir Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston, 1948), p. 328.

38. See Maxim Litvinov, Czechoslovakia and the World Crisis (New York, 1938).

39. Eduard Beneš, Úvahy o slovanství (Considerations on Slavdom; London, 1944), p. 179; henceforth cited as Úvahy.

40. Ibid., p. 180.

41. Ibid.

42. Beneš told the present writer that during the period of Munich Czechoslovakia had no assurance that the Soviets would have taken any action at all; see also Eduard Táborský, "Beneš and Stalin—Moscow 1943 and 1945," Journal of Central European Affairs, XIII (1953), 161.

43. Eduard Beneš, Paměti (Memoirs; Prague, 1947), p. 191; henceforth cited as Paměti.

44. This follows clearly from the reference to Czechoslovakia, made by V. M. Molotov in his speech in the Moscow Soviet on November 6, 1938. Having emphasized that "the Soviet Union did not and could not participate in the conspiracy at the expense of Czechoslovakia," Molotov simply stated that "the Soviet Union

proved that its attitude toward international treaties was entirely different. It proved before the whole world that its faithfulness to treaties relating to the struggle against aggression was unbreakable." See Československé listy (The Czechoslovak Newspaper), Vol. II, No. 5, March 15, 1944, p. 8.

45. See Gottwald's speech in the Permanent Committee of the Czechoslovak National Assembly of October 11, 1938, included in Klement Gottwald's Deset Let: Sborník statí a projevů (Ten Years: Collection of Articles and Speeches; Prague, 1946), p. 120.

46. See Klement Gottwald, So Sovietským svätzom na večné časy (With the Soviet Union Forever; Bratislava, 1951), p. 263.

47. Cf. text in the Czechoslovak Yearbook of International Law (London, 1942), p. 227.

48. Vojta Beneš, Světlo na křízovatkách (The Beacon on the Crossroads: Chicago, 1940), pp. 13, 41.

49. Paměti, p. 233.

50. Ibid., pp. 207-208.

51. Eduard Beneš, Šest let exilu a druhé světové války (Six Years of Exile and of the Second World War; Prague, 1946), p. 53; henceforth cited as Šest let exilu.

52. Ibid., p. 78.

53. See Zdeněk Fierlinger, Od Mnichova po Košice 1939-1945 (From Munich to Košice 1939-1945; Prague, 1946), p. 28, and passim.

54. Paměti, p. 224.

55. Clementis's war-time deviation was, however, never forgotten. In his trial in November 1952, he was charged with having taken up, when the war broke out, "an anti-Soviet attitude over the question of the Soviet-German pact and Finland, thereby drifting into the reactionary camp," Proceedings of the Trials of Slánský et al., as Broadcast by the Czechoslovak Home Service (New York, 1953), p. 65.

56. Paměti, p. 244.

57. Joseph Stalin, The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union (New York, 1945), p. 28.

58. Ibid., p. 33.

59. At the congress the program was outlined by the Soviet writer Alexey Tolstoy.

60. A complete description of the Slav activities in Moscow can be found in Albert Mousset, The World of the Slavs (New York, 1950), pp. 76 f.

61. See Hans Kohn, Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology (Notre Dame, 1953), p. 232.

62. In November 1943 a Slavic Seminar was held dealing with the Czechoslovak relationship to the other Slavs. Of the publications issued, the most important one was that of Vlado Clementis, Pan-Slavism, Past and Present (London, 1943).

63. The Czechoslovak-Polish Protocol of January 19, 1942; the Polish-Czechoslovak rapprochement started with the Polish-Czechoslovak Declaration of November 11, 1940, on post-war closer co-operation between the two states. For texts of both documents see L. W. Holborn, War and Peace Aims of the United Nations (Boston, 1943), pp. 452-453, and 467-469, respectively.

64. Úvahy, p. 195.

65. Paměti, pp. 392-393; see also Táborský, p. 159.

66. Paměti, pp. 393, 395.

67. Ibid., p. 394.

68. The treaty had a special clause (Art. 4) stipulating that the signatories would act "in accordance with the principles of mutual respect for their independence and sovereignty as well as of non-interference in the internal affairs of the other State"; for full text see Hubert Ripka, East and West (London, 1944), p. 76.

69. Šest let exilu, pp. 216-217.

70. "Pod slovanským praporem" (Under the Slavic Banner), Československé listy, Vol. I, No. 1, August 10, 1943.

71. Klement Gottwald, So Sovietským svätom na večné časy, p. 3.

72. See Paul E. Zinner, "Czechoslovakia: The Diplomacy of Eduard Beneš," The Diplomats, 1919-1939 (Princeton, 1953), p. 102.

73. Message to the Czechoslovak State Council in London of November 12, 1942; in Holburn, p. 441.

74. See Paměti, p. 390.

75. "Our treaty . . . pulled down, to a certain extent the wall between the Soviet Union and the Western world which regarded our policy as a sort of experiment, a sort of 'test case' —an example and attempt which was to show what the Soviet Union intends to do with its smaller neighbors after the war." Ibid., p. 415.

76. Úvahy, p. 211.

77. Ibid., p. 188.

78. Ibid., p. 207.

79. Ibid., p. 216.

80. Ibid., p. 217.

81. Ibid., p. 197.

82. Ibid., p. 216.

83. Ibid.

84. See the evidence of Eduard Táborský, the personal secretary of the President: "Yet by August 1944, new worries came, soon to be followed by even more serious matters which filled Beneš's mind with uneasiness and gravely shook his faith in Stalin's promises," op. cit., p. 169.

85. Úvahy, p. 194.

86. Ibid., p. 195.

87. Ibid., p. 196.

88. Táborský, pp. 171 f.

89. See Hugh Seton-Watson, East European Revolution (London, 1950), p. 164.

90. Táborský, pp. 179-180.

91. The seizure of Ruthenia was, also in Beneš's estimation, a clear breach of the 1943 treaty.

92. The actual purpose of Soviet Pan-Slavism has been described as follows: "Then, too, the idea of Slavic solidarity had an acknowledged advantage. It allowed the leaders of the liberated countries to disguise under the appearance of fraternal solidarity the state of dependence to which they were doomed by the new eastern equilibrium." Mousset, p. 94.

93. A. J. P. Taylor, "Czechoslovakia and Europe: The Foreign Policy of Dr. Beneš," Eduard Beneš, Essays and Reflections Presented on the Occasion of His Sixtieth Birthday (London, 1944), p. 169; R. W. Seton-Watson stated that "whatever the future may hold in store, it would seem probable that Czechoslovakia will perform an important function as a link between Eastern and Western tendencies in Europe. . ." ("Beneš and Masaryk," ibid., p. 190).

94. See Thomas Masaryk, The Slavs Among Nations (London, 1916), p. 12.

95. František Palacký, Františka Palackého spisy drobné (Writings of František Palacký; Prague, 1898), I, 339.

96. In a conversation with the present writer; see also Táborský, p. 162.

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